The Perils of Prescribed Fire: A Reconsideration by Pyne, Stephen J.
Volume 41 
Issue 1 Winter 2001 
Winter 2001 
The Perils of Prescribed Fire: A Reconsideration 
Stephen J. Pyne 
Recommended Citation 
Stephen J. Pyne, The Perils of Prescribed Fire: A Reconsideration, 41 Nat. Resources J. 1 (2001). 
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol41/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more 
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu. 
STEPHEN J. PYNE*
The Perils of Prescribed Fire: A
Reconsideration
THE CRISIS BOILED OVER in 1935. The previous summer's fires
in the Northern Rockies had sparked a board of review that questioned
whether fire protection in the backcountry was possible, or to the mind of
one dissenter, even desirable. The January meeting of the Society of
American Foresters (SAF) had sponsored a session, under the direction of
Professor H.H. Chapman, its president, on the value of controlled burning
along the southern coastal plain. The papers, which argued for fire, were a
revelation. This was, E.V. Komarek blurted out, the "first time we have been
told the facts." The proceedings were published in March. Two months
later, with competing claims before him, Chief Forester F.A. Silcox
promulgated the 10 A.M. policy as a universal standard for fire suppression
and stipulated that every fire would be controlled by 10 A.M. the morning
following its report, or failing that, by 10 A.M. the next day. Questions of
whether fire suppression was the right strategy or whether it was truly
possible were brushed aside. Even critics characterized themselves as
"heretics."
In truth, professional critics were few. Wildland fire control had
fought a bitter battle to establish itself before a skeptical public. The Forest
Service had begun fire protection only in 1905 or, more effectively, after the
Great Fires of 1910. As a bureaucratic exercise, it had thrived, under heavy
pressure and with mixed results, for only 25-30 years. Its supporters
believed that the public could accept only a simple, unified message: fire
was bad and fire suppression good. Anything less would gut fire
protection's grander mission. Enthusiasts explained away continued
breakdowns by the failure of the policy to enjoy the political support it
deserved and the money it required. The 10 A.M. policy gave suppression
virtual carte blanche, the Roosevelt Administration lavished men and
money on it, and professional forestry drowned out the voices of doubters.
There are echoes of an eerie symmetry between then and now.
Prescribed burning commenced as a formal policy in 1967-68 with the
National Park Service; the Forest Service modified policies until, in 1978-79,
it adopted a parallel program; a common federal-agency policy emerged in
December 1995, a charge to handle fire in an "appropriate" way, a mix of
fire fighting and fire lighting. Depending on when one chooses to date its
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origins, the doctrine of prescribed fire has lasted roughly as long as the
doctrine of systematic fire protection before the 1935 crisis. Prescribed
burning is not a new program. Its breakdowns-and they have been many,
even lethal-can no longer be explained away by bureaucratic stupor,
public hostility, or the need to build up a repository of experience. The time
has come to ask whether the existing regime of prescribed burning is, in
fact, fundamentally flawed, or whether it only requires a fuller
commitment, a kind of Clintonesque healthcare program for wildlands.
That the National Park Service lost two widely separated prescribed fires,
both set under extreme conditions in spring 2000, recalls the passage from
The Importance of Being Earnest in which Aunt Augusta observes that to lose
one parent may be regarded as a misfortune, while to lose both sounds like
carelessness. In this sense we have returned to 1935, with the escaped Cerro
Grande and Outlet fires taking the place of the Pete King-Selway fires of
1934.
Now the eerie part. Where is the board of review, questioning
whether prescribed fire should expand as suppression did? Where are the
equivalents of the SAF session on controlled burning? Where are the
professional skeptics, suggesting that prescribed burning may not be a
universal solution? The fire community, rather, seems determined to defend
prescribed fire as an idea, despite its lapses; to continue to believe that the
public cannot accept any kind of nuanced message; to behave as though any
doubt cast onto the value and technical possibilities of prescribed burning
will kill an irreplaceable program. Instead, they present controlled burning
as necessary. Often advocates describe it as easier, cheaper, and safer than
suppression. It is, inherently, none of these.
The fire community has presented the public with a false
dichotomy: either fire suppression, which has failed, or prescribed fire,
which continues to limp only because it has not been granted sufficient
support. We must light fires because we cannot fight them. The only way
to protect Los Alamos from burning down is to risk burning it down
accidentally. Fire is natural; fuels are excessive; there is no other option.
Nonsense. As in 1935, the fire community seems to fear that, confronted
with a compromised message, the public will throw the good out with the
bad. Yet that is, in fact, what will happen if bad burns are justified as good.
PRESCRIBED BURNING has racked up an impressive litany of
failures. Ouzel, Mack Lake, Seney, Gallagher Peak, Pocket, Yellowstone,
Lowden Ranch; these are among the best known. But escapes have occurred
yearly. Official statistics often hide more than they reveal. Over the past 20
years the worst fires of several entire seasons have been prescribed fires
gone bad. Since 1979 seven prescribed fires have killed firefighters (a new
twist on the concept of friendly fire). Smoke flooding across roads has
caused fatal car accidents. In 1980 an escaped fire burned Mack Lake,
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Michigan, to the ground. The two most costly firefights of American history
were controlled burns that blew up. Because escaped fires become
reclassified as wildfires, such failures are not always reckoned in final
talleys. These breakdowns will continue, and if prescribed burning scales
up, so will their size and cost.
The more serious failures, however, are those fires that simply don't
do the job they should. They bum too cool, too hot, too long, too spottily,
too infrequently. They create as much dead fuel as they remove. They occur
as an isolated bum, not amid a suite of practices and a series of sustained
fires. More broadly, the program has simply not racked up the necessary
acreage. Controlled fire simply isn't happening on the order promised or
required. Much of the burning is occurring not where it is most needed (the
West) but where it can most easily be done (the South). Some acreage that
was formally logged under "wildfire" is now registered as "wildland fire
use." And then there are the promised fires that are never lit. None enter
formally into the running register of failures.
Why has prescribed fire not flourished? The reasons are legion.
Liability law, smoke, threats to endangered species and cultural resources,
complicated land ownership, narrow "windows" for burning, insecure
expertise, competing purposes, lands overstuffed with fuels. Returning fire
to a landscape that has not known it for five to ten decades is tricky.
Preparations-thinning, mostly-are expensive and often arouse public ire.
Fires in heavy duff or logs will smolder, perhaps for weeks. The fire
community has hardly begun to address issues of greenhouse gases (has
barely begun to explain why, given global injunctions to sequester carbon,
they find it necessary to uproot and bum off tens of millions of acres laden
with living carbon). Controlled burning is re-emerging out of institutions
and funding designed to extinguish fire, which is a structurally different
task than igniting them. Wildfires create crises, which must be addressed;
unlit prescribed burns pass unnoticed. The list goes on.
But the nuclear reason may be the absence of a truly compelling
reason to bum, one that engages the public and links fire to culture as well
as to ecology. The problem is not one of policy but of poetry, a passionate
conviction of the heart, ideally expressed in a story, that can inspire as well
as inform. Fire control has that poetry-has had it since the Great Fires of
1910 invented the modem narrative of fire suppression and has seen it
revived with Norman Maclean's 1992 best-seller Young Men and Fire.
Controlled fire has no such story to tell.
It has instead two narrower convictions, that fire is natural and that
wildland fuels are excessive. Both are true, and both irrelevant. The fire-is-
natural argument calms critics worried that the proposed meddling is
something that the lands cannot tolerate. It notes that fire has been on the
planet for 400 million years and that many biotas are as adapted to
particular fire regimes as they are to patterns of rainfall. Since the mid-1960s
Winter 2001]
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the "restoration" of fire has enjoyed the same cachet as the reintroduction
of wolves-a necessary cog refitted into broken ecological machinery, a
powerful symbol of wild America, and penance for past environmental
wrongs. The preferred means was to let natural fires free-bum over wild
lands in the form of "prescribed natural fires." This was the program under
which, at a cost of more than $130 million, Yellowstone National Park
burned 945,000 acres, although Yellowstone didn't bother with the nuisance
of prescriptions. Unsurprisingly, the term is no longer used.
The more serious critique is that the fires to which the Western
landscapes had adapted were not really natural. They were, rather, the
result of complicated interactions between nature and people. Nature
contributed rhythms of wetting and drying, grew fuels and readied them
for burning, and broadcast lightning over select landscapes. But humans
were there to push their own ignitions, to rearrange fuels en masse, and to
carry fire where lightning couldn't. American Indians burned widely, and
so did frontiersmen, and they created a matrix within which lightning fire
had to operate. This had gone on since the end of the Wisconsin glacial. It
ended in the West only when overgrazing cropped off the grasses that had
carried the flames and when settlement removed the Indians who had
started them. Creating national parks and forests confirmed the trend
toward fire exclusion by making fire protection a deliberate policy. Granted
this history, it is hard to know what "natural" means or why it justifies
prescribed burning. The ancient chronicle of human burning, however, does
argue for people putting fire back in.
The more useful plea, or rather threat-the alarm that has pried
money out of Congress-is that a history of excluding fire has stockpiled
the public wildlands with surplus fuels to the point that a fire, from any
source, can virtually detonate. This is unquestionably true in places, and
high-intensity fires beyond the historic range of burning are becoming
normal, again in select places. There's no fuel like an old fuel. But it is not
true everywhere. Woods clogged with combustibles do not spontaneously
erupt into flame, and there are many long-unburned sites in temperate
lands that become less fire-prone with the passing years. Piling pine needles
does not add to fire hazard, since only the upper crust will carry the flaming
front. Adding annual rings to old-growth Douglas fir does nothing to
worsen fire hazards, and may lessen them by serving as a heat sink. In
places without regular wet-dry cycles, deciduous forests may crowd out
conifers and smother fire in the shade. It certainly does not follow that
restoring fire is the only means to check conflagrations. Fire's exclusion did
not, alone, create the current crisis, and fire's reintroduction will not,
unaided, correct it.
Fire works best in nature as it does in the lab, as a catalyst. It
interacts. It quickens, shakes, forces. What caused the fuel buildup was not
simply the forced absence of fire but the linked changes between fire and
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human land use--grazing, logging, hunting, farming, foraging. Fire by itself
cannot reverse those massive shifts, and thrusting a torch into fuel-choked
sites today, without suitable preparations, is an incitement to ecological riot.
Even if the fire does not escape, it may bum under conditions far different
from those of the past. The places that most need fire are often those whose
fuels cannot now readily accept a spark. It is not possible to flash-bum a
forest the way oil wells can flare off unwanted gas. Too many foresters, in
particular, continue to conceive of fire as a "tool," to imagine it as a
mechanical force for removing, thinning, shuffling, harvesting, to imagine
that it behaves rather like, well, foresters rather than as a biological presence
whose power derives from its setting.
The argument that only prescribed fire can reduce fuel is absurd.
If excess fuel is the problem, then remove it. Haul it off, bum it in fireplaces
and powerplants, mulch it into compost, send it through woodchippers.
Crush it; crop it. Browse it with goats. Thin and stack it before burning.
Bum sun-dried cuttings while the surrounding woods are still green. Bum
piles in the snow. On sites dense with combustibles, a bum may yield more
dead fuel than it consumes. A fire may sputter and smolder, unable to gnaw
through thick veneers of woody matter. Fire, remember, is a catalyst: it
synthesizes its surroundings. Messed-up landscapes will yield messed-up
fires. Prescribed fire, in brief, is not a miraculous cure that, on touching,
dissolves away the leprosy of woody litter. Some experimental fires have
succeeded in killing large trees and sparing small ones, exactly the reverse
of historic patterns and intended outcomes. Besides, a prescribed bum is
not a vaccination, a one-off inoculation against conflagration. It typically
involves a series of bums, often with complex preparations, then repeated
in perpetuity. Presumably, the bums become easier as they successively
return, and once a site has plumped into such a state, regular burning is a
marvelous means to keep fuels under wraps. But that must be part of a 20-
30 year program.
Prescribed fire requires a better justification. For burning to be
mandatory, worth almost any risk, the critical consideration is not reducing
fuel but promoting the biotic cycling that fire sets into motion. No
alternative technology exists because free-burning fire is not so much a tool
as a captured ecological process, less a flaming ax than a dancing grizzly.
Combustion works biologically in ways that chain saws and woodchippers
don't. We have it backward. We don't need fire to reduce fuel, we need fuel
to allow fire to work its ecological magic. After all, "fuel" is not carbon
bullion; it is the product of living organisms. Our determination of
ecological needs should select the kind of fire we want, which will
determine the kind of fuel necessary.
The outcome will be mixed, as it should be. There will be some
places where fire is mandatory, some where it is useful and optional, some
where it is irrelevant or simply dangerous. The outcome should not be
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merely a fuel-reduced landscape but a fire regime suitable for the biota and,
where people reside, habitable.
PURPOSES CANNOT be separated from practices. Part of why
controlled burning has faltered may lie in how we do it. The federal
agencies conduct prescribed fires as they do firefights. The legal and
regulatory environments in which flame must today exist push agencies in
this direction, and so does their own history. Controlled burning is re-
emerging out of institutions designed to fight fire. This is awkward, and the
National Park Service, in particular, has tried to counter it by creating
parallel, mirror-image organizations.
The scheme is understandable, and mad. It ignores the fact that the
two tasks depend on each other, that fire suppression requires burning and
that prescribed fire requires control, and their divorce can lead to situations
like that at the Cerro Grande fire in which the burn boss in charge of
ignition is not certified to oversee suppression should the flames escape.
Equally, it dismisses the fundamental differentness of the tasks, that
fighting and lighting should operate through divergent styles and methods
on the ground. Suppression looks much the same everywhere, because it is
a reaction. Prescribed fire should look different with every site. A peril of
prescribed fire is that it will simply invert suppression, in both principle
and practice; that it will repeat with the left hand the failures of the right.
To conduct prescribed fire on a fire-suppression model is, in the end, to
share its costs, risks, and dangers. Any single factor may shut the project
down, while none allows it to jump ahead. Scheduled bums are a formula
for constant attrition. The program will regress year after year.
Instead, on larger landscapes, fire managers may need to be fire
foragers-constantly searching out small niches of fuels, as a bear might
seek out huckleberry patches; prowling the snowline with piddling burns;
constantly moving and burning, not in one grand set-piece of fire-kindling
but in a finicky gathering of fuel and flame. Such a program requires lots of
fire, lots of smoke, lots of time in the field. It means that most places can't
accept such a regimen because they have changed too profoundly since
fire's forced removal. It means that urban critics will object to the chronic
smoke and wilderness critics to the fact that people, not nature, are setting
the fires. It means that fire's reintroduction will not succeed in many places,
that the domain of fire will be a scant fraction of what it was a century and
a half ago, that it will cluster especially in remote places. That may be the
best we can do.
Be sad. Many of us believe the Western landscapes need more fire
of the right sort. Some of us consider the manipulation of fire, a species
monopoly, as a species obligation to see that it happens properly. We
shouldn't turn the task back to nature because nature gave it to us. (If we
really want to appreciate the awfulness of bungled fire, wait until nature
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grants the power to another species.) But if the right fire is the right thing
for the land, then we have to find a way to do it, and not pretend that bad
fires are good. We can't allow feral fire to roam through towns like
ravenous grizzlies. Rogue burns like the Cerro Grande and Outlet deserve
to be hunted down and shot.
FAILURES OF OMISSION, failures of commission-all of them
could be excused, and were excused, when prescribed fire was fresh and
experience sparse. The practice is no longer new, and if 30 years is not a
long enough learning curve, then one might question on what basis we
should expand programs and push them into new lands. Thirty years was
enough for fire suppression's critics to recognize its limits. Yet the
suppression crowd could shout back that it had never been given the
tools--the men, the money, the machines-it needed to do the job right. If
the choice was between continuing the firefight or reverting to light
burning, they wanted the fight. They would never turn back to the pre-
suppression era.
Now it is prescribed fire's turn. How long will it take before critics
rise up and declare that prescribed burning has failed to live up to its
promise? Most fire officials came of age during the controversy over free-
burning fire in wilderness; too many seem locked into the Good Fight
against the Smokey-Bear-kill-every-fire era, insisting that fire is natural, that
there can be no return to the old ways, that prescribed burning has never
received the money and staffing it needed to do the job right. This misses
the point precisely. The antagonist is no longer fire suppression. The debate
is internal, over the right ends, means, and places to reinstate fire. The
choice is not between fighting fires and lighting them but over the proper
ways and times to do each, and that within a context that transcends either
practice alone. The danger is that programmatic momentum will simply roll
on and that, as in 1935, there may be a tendency among those full of
conviction and frustration to replace on-the-ground facts with political fiat
and agency "targets" for burning, thinning, expending, and staffing that
may or may not have much relevance in the duff.
As the 2000 fire season migrated from the feral controlled bums of
the Southwest to the wildfires of, the Northern Rockies, the spreading
conflagrations deflected the early-season critique of prescribed fire, much
as disappearing hard drives from the vaults of the Los Alamos National Lab
diverted attention from the scandal of careless burning into the scandal of
sloven security. Fire observers scrambled to find a different standard, some
index for comparison. Steadily the cry rose that this year might rival the
millennial Big Blowup of 1910. It didn't, though its burned acreage on the
national forests might have come close. Still, a surprising consensus
flourished that the whole fire establishment dated, in some ineffable way,
from that distant summer; that the entire apparatus of wildland fire-its
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politics, the terms of its philosophical discourse, its funding, its very
narrative-had emerged in that dreadful year; and that this year might not
only challenge the Great Fires' physical dimensions but their historical
significance. Neither proved true. But the popular allusion held a hard
kernel of truth within it, and it became embedded in the formal proposal
issued by the White House in September for the rehabilitation of the fire-
scarred lands. The Great Fires of 1910 became the metric for interpreting the
Flawed (Lesser) Fires of 2000.
The real lesson of 1910 lay in its explication of fire's political
ecology. Perhaps appropriately, the dynamics much resemble the logic of
swidden (that is, slash and bum). One can plant successfully in the ash. A
year later, however, the proper occasion has passed. After two years the site
is overrun with the weeds of everyday life and politics. Whatever effect the
Fires of 2000 might inspire, they have until the summer of 2001 to act, and
that amid a presidential election that will see a change of administration but
which safely ignored the flames once they had lapsed from nightly
television news.
In brief, fire assumes the character of its context-cultural as well
as environmental. Real reform requires a reconstitution of that context. It
means, ecologically, rehabilitating tens of millions of public-domain acres,
through thinning, restricted grazing, prescribed fire, exotic weed control,
suppression, and a dozen other tweakings. It means resituating programs
within the federal bureaucracy. Probably only a fundamental reorganiza-
tion of the federal land agencies-their wholesale merger and reengineering
-could provide sufficient political momentum to carry through a reforma-
tion of fire programs even approximally equivalent to that which succeeded
the Great Fires. Even more vexing, it means inventing a new narrative to
explain our relationship to fire. It means a story more nuanced and
powerful than either the firefight or its stood-on-its-head twin, prescribed
burning.
The likely outcome is that nothing on this scale will occur. But it
might. As long as we have wildlands in fire-prone climates, which is the
indisputable status of the West, we will have fires. The option still exists to
choose what kind we can live with.
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